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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY
WORKING PAPERS
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialized research unit set up as a
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian
Taxation Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation
and contestation occur within the tax system.
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation
compliance.
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge,
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews






This paper empirically examines Australian taxpayers’ perceptions of their tax
practitioners and ‘ideal’ tax practitioners, using a sample of 2040 randomly selected
Australian taxpayers who completed the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey
(Braithwaite, 2000). This research identifies the basic dimensions that underlie taxpayer
judgements of the attributes of their ideal tax practitioner. One kind of tax practitioner
sought by certain taxpayers is the ‘creative accountant, aggressive tax planning type’.
Here the taxpayer is also looking for a practitioner who is well networked and knows
what the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) is checking at a particular time. This
is by far the least popular preference among ordinary individual taxpayers, but clearly
one of the greatest concern to tax authorities. A second type of practitioner sought by
taxpayers is one who engages in ‘cautious minimisation of tax’. Unlike the creative
accountants, practitioners of this type avoid conflict, while being sophisticated about
identifying opportunity to minimise tax. The most popular type of practitioner with
taxpayers is the ‘low risk, no fuss’ practitioner who is honest and risk averse. The data
also show that taxpayers are likely to find tax practitioners who have the attributes they
value most highly in a practitioner. Further work is needed to understand the matching
process, in particular, how high risk practitioners and high risk taxpayers form their
partnerships.
1Taxpayers’ perceptions of the ideal tax adviser: Playing safe or saving dollars?
Yuka Sakurai and Valerie Braithwaite
Introduction
The self-assessment system for determining income tax liability was introduced by
the Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) in 1986. Apart from increasing
administrative efficiency, self-assessment was an expression of confidence by the
Australian Government in the Tax Office’s move to fostering a voluntary taxpaying
culture. The system, however, brought its own costs to taxpayers. The burden of
keeping appropriate income/expense records and computing their tax bases and
liability has led to considerable numbers of taxpayers seeking advice from tax
practitioners.1 Taxpayers may seek professional assistance to reduce perceptions of
complexity and legal uncertainty, save time, or even exploit ‘grey areas’ of the law.
Thus, depending upon the motivations of taxpayers, the technical knowledge and
professional experience of tax practitioners can be used to improve compliance, or
undermine it. Tax agents for high wealth individuals directly claim to influence
compliance (Braithwaite, 2001). The general question arising is how important is the
role played by tax practitioners in tax compliance overall among the general
population; and more specifically, how does the game of ‘aggressive’ tax reporting
come into play. Is it led by taxpayers or tax practitioners?2
A brief review of the literature
Past research on the compliance behaviour of taxpayers and/or tax practitioners has
produced conflicting results. Some studies indicate that tax practitioners view their
clients as initiators of aggressive tax reporting (Attwell & Sawyer, 2001; Klepper &
Nagin, 1989; Schisler, 1994; Tooley, 1992). There is some evidence that taxpayers
intentionally understate income or overstate deductions (Hasseldine & Kaplan, 1990).
Other studies show that the primary reason taxpayers use tax practitioners is to file an
                                                
1 In 1980, approximately 20% of taxpayers sought professional assistance to prepare returns. The figure
rose to 72% in 1992 (Boreham, 1994; Marshall, Smith & Armstrong, 1997).
2 In this paper, tax practitioners include certified public accountants, tax lawyers and tax agents. A tax
agent is defined as a person who prepares income tax returns and transacts business on behalf of
taxpayers in income tax matters, and who is registered with the relevant Tax Agent’s Board (Income
Tax Assessment Act 1936, Sec 251 JA).
2accurate tax return (Collins, Milliron & Toy, 1990; Tan, 1999), and that taxpayers
prefer conservative advice to aggressive advice from their tax practitioners (Hite &
McGill, 1992). Whatever taxpayers’ reasons are for using tax practitioners, the
partnership of taxpayer and tax practitioner is an influential one: past research shows
that paid-prepared tax returns tend to be more aggressive than taxpayer-prepared
returns (Erard, 1993; Hite & Sawyer, 1998; Klepper & Nagin, 1989)
Tan’s study (1999) further indicates that taxpayers tend to accept the recommendation
of their tax advisers, irrespective of the type of advice (aggressive or conservative).
Moreover, taxpayers’ decisions to terminate or retain the services of their tax
practitioners do not depend upon the type of advice the tax practitioners provide, but
rather on their working relationship. This suggests that taxpayers’ compliance
behaviour may be strongly influenced by their advisers, particularly in situations
where reliance on advisers is high.
The extent to which tax practitioners meet the special needs of taxpayers depends on a
number of factors. First, tax practitioners have their own codes of practice that may
shape their responsiveness to taxpayer needs (Cruz, Shafer & Strawser, 2000;
Marshall, Smith & Armstrong, 1997). Second, tax practitioners are operating in a
competitive market. Their survival may depend on their capacity to do what taxpayers
ask of them, be it legal, illegal or on the margins. Some studies suggest that tax
practitioners choose the type of advice (aggressive or conservative) they give to their
clients on the basis of the characteristics of the clients, such as client risk preferences
(Duncan, LaRue & Reckers, 1989).
In considering the ethical behaviour of the tax adviser, Myers (1990: 80) asserts that
tax lawyers’ ethical responsibility ‘is to uphold the law and to discharge his duty to
his client according to the best of his knowledge and ability. It is not dictated by
changes in public opinion about perceived evils of tax avoidance or the morality of
organising one’s affairs to minimise tax.’ In a similar fashion, it has been argued that
the ultimate goal of tax practitioners is to minimise tax for their clients. This goal is
achieved through tax practitioners acting upon a good faith belief that ‘the position to
be taken has a realistic possibility of being sustained administratively or judicially on
its merits’ (Hansen, Crosser & Laufer, 1992: 679). The above argument implies that it
3is acceptable for tax practitioners to make the most of the grey areas of the law. A
problem arises for tax practitioners when technical compliance to use the law to
minimise tax conflicts with individual moral ethics about the desirability of paying tax
in accordance with the spirit of the law. Research indicates that satisfying a
professional code and a personal code, meeting the expectations of clients, and
achieving financial success may not always be compatible drivers of tax practitioners’
behaviour (Cruz et al., 2000; Marshall, et al., 1997; Newberry, Reckers & Wyndelts,
1993).
Tax practitioners, however, are not entirely at the mercy of taxpayer demands, and
they are not passive players in the market. As members of an elite profession, tax
practitioners are in a privileged position for setting standards and even creating needs
(Gordon, 1988). Marshall, Armstrong and Smith (1998) reported that among 472 tax
practitioners who were registered with the Taxation Board of Western Australia, 51%
considered there to be many opportunities for practitioners to engage in unethical
practices, but only 22% were aware that their peer practitioners actually engaged in
unethical practices. Furthermore, these tax practitioners did not believe that unethical
behaviour was necessary for success in tax practice, nor that tax practitioners had to
compromise their personal ethics to be successful. This suggests that tax practitioners
in Australia are confident about their capacity to manage inappropriate demands from
their clients. By the same token, Marshall et al. (1998) have observed notable
diversity in the attitudes and experiences of tax practitioners in Australia. This raises
the question: What is driving diversity in the profession?
Klepper, Mazur and Nagin (1991) suggest that tax practitioners play ‘dual roles’
depending on the ambiguity of the tax law, that is, being enforcers of the tax law in
unambiguous situations and being exploiters of tax law in ambiguous situations. In
addition, past research indicates that the professional status of tax practitioners may
influence the role they play; that is, certified practising accountants (CPAs) are more
aggressive than non-CPAs in their interpretations of the law (Ayers, Jackson & Hite,
1989). Tomasic and Pentony (1991) reported that Australian tax practitioners are in
general critical of ‘tax avoidance schemes’ or ‘artificial paper schemes’ for
minimising tax. However, they are not so critical of making use of ‘tax shelters’ such
4as off-shore transactions and tax havens. Tax practitioners, it seems, are likely to use
loopholes of the law, but most are unlikely to engage in illegal schemes.
The role of tax practitioners has expanded to include advising on financial
management, planning the timing of tax incidences, and liaising with lawyers on the
interpretation and application of tax laws (Marshall et al., 1997). As large accounting
firms have transformed themselves into multidisciplinary practices, tax practitioners
in these firms have begun to market ‘products’ or ‘devices’ for tax savings to their
clients (Rosen, 1999). Through media and promotional campaigns, the image of a
steady, honest and reliable ‘numbers person’ now exists alongside the image of a
sharp and clever financial player. Tax practitioners seem to be seeking niche markets,
cultivating different images and skills for different clients. But how successful has the
marketing of tax practitioners been? Do taxpayers identify and differentiate the skills
that tax practitioners have to offer? Do they seek out tax practitioners who deliver the
kinds of skills they want?
This paper uses data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey
(Braithwaite, 2000) to examine: 1) taxpayers’ perceptions of their own understanding
of and competence in completing their income tax returns; 2) the sources of support
they most commonly use; and 3) the qualities they are most likely to look for in their
ideal tax practitioner. Finally, we ask the question: 4) do taxpayers find the tax
practitioners who meet their needs?
Method
Between May and October of 2000, the names and addresses of 7754 Australians
were chosen at random from the Australian public electoral rolls. The population
comprised all Australian citizens over 18 who were eligible to vote in elections and
enrolled as of February 2000. Each person was mailed the Community Hopes, Fears
and Actions Survey as well as a pre-paid reply envelope for its return upon
completion. Two thousand and forty completed questionnaires (29% of those
5respondents who could be contacted) were received.3 Of these completed
questionnaires, 47% were from men and 53% were from women. The average age of
the respondents was 48 years. Seventy per cent were married, and 14% were divorced
or separated. Twenty-four per cent had a tertiary qualification, 70% had some
secondary education, and 6% had no more than a primary school education. The
average personal income for the respondents was $27,830 (see Appendix 1).
Analyses and results
Question 1: How do taxpayers judge their competence and diligence in preparing
their income tax returns?
1-1: Understanding Tax Office expectations of taxpayers
Taxpayers were asked: ‘When you were preparing for the lodgement of your 1998–
1999 income tax return, how well did you understand what the Tax Office expected of
you? Would you say your understanding was ‘extremely good’ (1), ‘good’ (2),
‘reasonable’ (3), ‘partial’ (4), or ‘poor’ (5)?’ On average, respondents had a fairly
good understanding of Tax Office expectations (M = 2.72, SD = 1.05). As shown in
Table 1, approximately 42% of respondents said they had an extremely good or good
understanding, and a further 40% had a reasonable understanding. The remaining
18% had a partial (11%) or poor understanding (8%).
Table 1: ‘When you were preparing for the lodgement of your 1998–1999 income
tax return, how well did you understand what the Tax Office expected of you?






Poor   7.7
                                                
3 Excluded from the sample base were respondents who were deceased, too ill to take part in the
survey, or no longer at the address.
4Note that the large number of missing cases is due to the fact that the sample included individuals who
were not required to lodge an income tax return.
61-2: Competency to complete an income tax return
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of themselves as taxpayers. They
were asked how much they identified with the statement: ‘I feel competent to do my
own income tax return’. The response scale ranged from 1 to 4 (1 = not at all, 2 = a
little bit, 3 = a fair bit, and 4 =very much). The mean score (M = 2.13, SD = 1.05)
suggests that taxpayers were not overly confident about their capacity to perform the
task of completing a tax return on their own. It is of note that more than one-third of
taxpayers stated that they did not feel at all competent (36%) to do their income tax
return under the self-assessment system. At the other end of the scale, 12% identified
themselves as being very much in the competent category. Of those expressing in-
between answers, about a quarter said ‘a little bit competent’ (26%), and another
quarter said ‘a fair bit’ (see Table 2).
Table 2: ‘How much is the following like you: I feel competent to do my own
income tax return’ (n = 1953)
Response categories Percentage
Not at all 36.4
A little bit 26.3
A fair bit 24.9
Very much 12.4
1-3: Confidence in the legitimacy of deductions and rebates
Competence in preparing a tax return might be expected to be related to feeling
confident that one has done the right thing. Table 3 shows the percentage of
respondents who expressed different levels of confidence in the legitimacy of the
deductions and rebates in their 1998–1999 income tax return. The response categories
ranged from 1 to 4 (1 = absolutely confident, 2 = a bit unsure, 3 = pretty unsure, 4 =
haven’t got a clue). The majority of respondents (85%) stated that they were
absolutely confident about the legitimacy of the deductions they claimed, despite the
relatively small percentage of respondents in Table 2 who described themselves as
fully competent to do their own income tax return. Interestingly, 7% claimed that they
did not have a clue about the legitimacy of the deductions and rebates because
someone else did it for them.
7Table 3: ‘Think of the deductions and rebates you claimed in your 1998–1999
income tax return. Would you say you were…’ (n = 1625)5
Response categories Percentage
Absolutely confident that they were all legitimate 84.7
A bit unsure about some of them   7.9
Pretty unsure about quite a lot   0.7
Haven’t got a clue, someone else did it for me   6.6
Overall, most taxpayers seem to be coping well with the self-assessment system,
although it also appears that a substantial proportion are not entirely comfortable with
the image of themselves as self-sufficient in their knowledge of what they should be
doing. A significant proportion lack certainty about their competence and Tax Office
expectations. Yet they express confidence that they have done no wrong, at least with
regard to their deductions. The next section looks to the sources of such confidence.
1-4: Dependency on someone else to complete a tax return
Taxpayers were asked to indicate the degree to which they were the kind of taxpayer
who relied on someone else to look after their tax matters for them (see Table 4).
Almost 40% of taxpayers stated that they did not have anyone else to do it for them.
On the other hand, 48% expressed the view that getting someone else to look after
their tax described their way of operating fairly well or very well.
Table 4: ‘How much is the following like you: I have someone else who looks
after my tax matters for me’ (n = 1937)
Response categories Percentage
Not at all 39.8
A little bit 12.2
A fair bit 18.7
Very much 29.4
1-5: Low priority in preparing a tax return
Achievement and effort are terms commonly used to distinguish achieving a required
standard and directing time and energy toward achieving the standard. Within the
                                                
5 Note that the large number of missing cases is due to the fact that the sample included individuals
who were not required to lodge an income tax return.
8context of taxation, a distinction can be drawn between competency to comply with a
self-assessment return and the priority given to directing competency towards the
achievement of a goal. With a view to measuring the dimension of effort or priority,
respondents were asked how well each of the following statements described their tax
behaviour:
a) I tend to put my income tax return off until the last minute;
b) Preparing an income tax return is a low priority in my life; and
c) Other things always seem to get in the way of doing my tax.
Respondents were required to choose one of categories1 to 4 for each item (1 = not at
all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = a fair bit, and 4 = very much like me). The percentage
breakdown of responses to each question appears in Table 5. These data show that
most taxpayers reject the suggestion that they assign a low priority to attending to tax
matters.
Table 5: Percentage breakdown of responses to the low priority on tax questions
 (n = 1910–1933)
Response categories Item (a) Item (b) Item (c) Tax-is-Not-a-Priority
Scale
Not at all 50.7 41.5 48.7 53.6
A little bit 23.3 28.5 28.1 30.1
A fair bit 15.4 18.0 15.3 12.1
Very much 10.6 12.1   7.9   4.2
Because the above three items were strongly intercorrelated, responses were summed
and divided by the number of items (3 items) in the scale to form a ‘Tax-is-Not-a-
Priority’ Scale. The alpha reliability coefficient of the scale was 0.82, with item-total
correlations ranging from 0.62 to 0.72. As expected from the data in Table 5, the
mean of the scale was quite low (1.89), with a standard deviation of 0.87. When the
scale scores were rounded off and forced into the four categories used in the original
scoring system (see the last column in Table 5), 54% were closest to outright rejection
of the suggestion that they placed a low priority on tax matters. For the remaining
46%, however, there was a glimmer of self-truth in the depiction of the taxpayer who
did not put sufficient time into putting their tax affairs in order.
91-6: Data summary
This section examined how taxpayers judge their competence and diligence in
preparing their income tax returns. Results suggest that the majority of taxpayers take
care with their tax return, are aware of perhaps not knowing all they need to know,
and have someone they can turn to for help. Interestingly, in spite of some general
doubts under the self-assessment system, the vast majority of respondents reported
confidence in the legitimacy of the deductions they claimed. This confidence may be
explained by their relatively high dependence on others to look after their tax return,
presumably tax practitioners. This presumption is tested in the next section.
Question 2: Who do taxpayers rely on when preparing their income tax returns?
Taxpayers were asked whether or not they relied on the following people in preparing
their 1998–1999 income tax return: a) family members/close friends; b) tax
agent/adviser; c) business partner; d) someone from the Tax Office; e) industry
associations; and f) one of their employees. In general, taxpayers relied on only one
other source (69%). The frequency of use of each possible source is summarised in
Table 6. Results are consistent with other research (Marshall et al., 1997) in showing
taxpayers’ heavy reliance upon tax agents (77%) in the Australian context. Over 20%
of respondents relied upon family members or close friends. Notably less involved in
the helping process were the Tax Office (6.5%), business partners (3.7%), industry
associations (3.2%) and employees (1.0%).
Table 6: ‘Did you rely on the following people in preparing your 1998–1999
income tax return?’ (n = 1311–1604)6
People respondents relied on Percentages
a)  Family members/ close friends 21.3
b)  Tax agent/adviser 77.1
c)  Business partner   3.7
d)  Tax Office staff   6.5
e)  Industry association   3.2
f)  One of your employees   1.0
                                                
6 Note that the large number of missing cases is due to the fact that the sample included individuals
who were not required to lodge an income tax return. Missing data increased when taxpayers were
asked about help from their industry association and employees. These questions are not relevant to all
taxpayers.
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Question 3: What are the attributes that taxpayers are looking for in tax agents?
Respondents were presented with a set of attributes that could describe their preferred
tax practitioner. They were asked to indicate the priority they would place on each
attribute if they were in a situation where they had to choose a tax agent or adviser
(see list of attributes in Table 7). Responses were given on a scale of 1 to 4 (1 = low
priority, 2 = medium priority, 3 = high priority, and 4 = top priority).
The responses were factor analysed to find out if respondents discriminated between
the various qualities that tax practitioners might bring to the job. Can taxpayers make
the distinction between the need to make money, to do the right thing, and to avoid
impropriety in the same way as tax practitioners do?
Three factors were extracted using a principal components analysis. Together they
accounted for 64% of the variance in the item set. The factors were rotated using the
varimax procedure. The results appear in Table 7.
The first factor is defined primarily by three items: having a creative accountant;
having someone who can deliver on aggressive tax planning; and having someone
who is well networked and knows what the Tax Office is checking. Lower loadings
appear for taking advantage of the grey areas of the law and not involving the
taxpayer in the process. The factor corresponds to a style of financial advising not
peculiar to tax that is described by McBarnet (2000). The factor is therefore given the
broader label of ‘creative accounting, aggressive tax planning’.
The second factor is defined by high loadings on having someone to do one’s tax
honestly and without fuss; and having someone who does not take risks and only
claims for things that are clearly legitimate. A moderate loading appears for the item,
being able to deal with any problems that arise. The factor is called ‘low risk with no
fuss’.
The third factor is defined by the items: someone who can minimise the tax paid;
someone who can take advantage of grey areas of the law; and to a lesser extent,
someone who can deal with any problems that might arise. Factor 3 represents the
11
gentle face of Factor 1 and is therefore called ‘cautious minimising with conflict
avoidance’.
Table 7: Rotated factor loadings for ratings of the attributes of a good tax
practitioner











a) A creative accountant 0.82 0.01 0.22
b) Someone who can deliver on
aggressive tax planning
0.76 -0.00 0.33
c) Someone who is well
networked and knows what
the Tax Office is checking on
at any particular time
0.66 0.17 0.32
d) Someone who just does it and
doesn’t bother me with it
0.48 0.02 -0.27
e) Someone who will do it
honestly and with minimum
fuss
0.02 0.88   0.08
f) Someone who does not take
risks and only claims for
things that are clearly
legitimate
0.06 0.85 -0.15
g) Someone who knows their
way around the system to
minimise the tax I have to pay
0.16 0.00 0.83
h) Someone who will take
advantage of grey areas of the
law on my behalf
0.42 -0.20 0.65
i) Someone who is able to deal
with any problems that arise
0.04 0.54 0.59
j) Eigenvalue before rotation 2.95 1.82 1.02
12
On the basis of this analysis, three scales were formed to represent: 1) the low risk
with no fuss approach; 2) cautious minimising with conflict avoidance; and 3)
creative accounting, aggressive tax planning. These scales were formed through
summing responses to the items that loaded above 0.6 on the factor of the same name
listed in Table 7. The summed scores were divided by the number of items
comprising each scale, so that summed scores would correspond to the original metric
to aid interpretation. A score close to 4 means top priority when choosing a tax
practitioner, while a score close to 1 means low priority. The means (M), standard
deviations (SD), and alpha reliability coefficients (α) for each scale are shown in
Table 8.
Table 8: Means (M), standard deviations (SD), alpha reliability coefficients
(diagonal), and intercorrelations for the preferred tax practitioner scales
(n = 1918–1930)
Scales   M       (SD) 1 2 3
1. Low risk with no fuss approach 3.27   (0.63) 0.76
2. Cautious minimising with conflict
avoidance
2.33   (0.78) 0.079 0.70
3. Creative accounting, aggressive tax
planning
2.22   (0.79) 0.077 0.487 0.79
Mean scores indicate that the highest priority is given to the low risk with no fuss
approach, followed by cautious minimising with conflict avoidance and, finally,
creative accounting, aggressive tax planning. From Table 8, it is noteworthy that the
correlation between cautious minimisation with conflict avoidance and creative
accounting, aggressive tax planning is positive and moderately high (r = 0.49,
p<.001). This means that those who are looking for a tax practitioner who minimises
tax without conflict are also open to considering a tax practitioner who does the job
more aggressively. Interestingly, both scales are independent of having a tax
practitioner who does the job honestly without fuss. In other words, knowing that a
person is interested in having a tax practitioner who will minimise tax, even if they go
to the edge to do so, tells us nothing about whether that person cares if the tax
practitioner is honest, gets the job done without fuss, and stays on the right side of the
law. This means that while some taxpayers trade off honesty for tax minimisation,
others do not. For some taxpayers at least, finding a tax practitioner who is cautious,
honest, and clever at minimising tax is the ideal. These expectations are not
13
necessarily incompatible in the minds of taxpayers. Figures 1 to 3 show the
percentage breakdown of responses to desired attributes of a tax practitioner.
Figure 1.  Desired attribute of tax agent
Figure 1.  Desired attribute of tax agent
Figure 2.  Desired attribute of tax agent













































Figure 3.  Desired attribute of tax agent
Question 4: Who are the tax practitioners that this sample of taxpayers uses?
4-1: What are the attributes of the tax practitioners that taxpayers actually have
engaged?
Taxpayers were asked to indicate how strongly they disagreed or agreed (1 = strongly
disagree, 5 = strongly agree) with each of the following five statements about their
current tax practitioner. The means and standard deviations of responses on a 1 to 5
scale are shown alongside each statement in Figure 4. The mean scores reflect how
closely the statement describes the tax practitioners this sample is currently using.























a) My tax agent is a very honest
person
b) My tax agent helps me interpret
ambiguous or grey areas of the tax
law in my favour
c) I have a tax agent who is clever
in the way she/he arranges my
affairs to minimize tax
d) My tax agent has warned me
against getting involved in tax
planning schemes
e) My tax agent has suggested
complicated schemes I could get
into to avoid tax
Figure 4.  Means and standard deviations for perceived attributes of current tax
practitioners
The attribute taxpayers most strongly associate with their tax practitioner is honesty.
A little lower, but still above the mid-point of the scale, are the items: ability to
interpret grey areas of the tax law; followed by cleverness in minimising tax; and
next, providing warnings against tax planning schemes. Few respondents reported that
their tax agents suggested complicated schemes to avoid tax.
4-2: Do taxpayers have the tax practitioners who match their ideal?
The scales representing the preferred attributes of tax practitioners – 1) ‘low risk with
no fuss approach’; 2) ‘cautious minimising with conflict avoidance’; and 3) ‘creative
accounting, aggressive tax planning’ – were correlated with ratings taxpayers had
given to the tax practitioners who were currently helping them. These findings are


















Table 9: Pearson product-moment correlations between the preferred attributes
of tax practitioners and the perceived attributes of the tax practitioners
taxpayers are currently using (n = 1243–1266)7
Preferred attributes of tax practitioners













a) My tax agent is a very honest
person
  0.298***  -0.033   0.039
b) My tax agent helps me
interpret ambiguous or grey
areas of the tax law in my
favour
 -0.018   0.329***   0.255***
c) I have a tax agent who is
clever in the way she/he
arranges my affairs to
minimise tax
 -0.057   0.313***   0.306***
d) My tax agent has warned me
against getting involved in tax
planning schemes
  0.070  -0.029   0.068
e) My tax agent has suggested
complicated schemes I could
get into to avoid tax
 -0.180***   0.186***   0.349***
***p<.001
Taxpayers whose preference was for a low risk with no fuss approach taken by a tax
practitioner were more likely to judge their current tax practitioner as honest. They
also reported that their tax agents were less likely to suggest complicated avoidance
schemes. A different pattern of correlations emerged for taxpayers who preferred a
tax minimising approach, regardless of whether the approach was cautious
minimising with conflict avoidance or creative accounting and aggressive tax
planning. That is, those who preferred a tax minimising practitioner were more likely
to describe the practitioner whom they currently used as helpful in interpreting the
grey areas of the law, clever at reducing tax, and as more likely to suggest
complicated tax avoidance schemes.
                                                
7 This analysis was performed on the sub-sample who use a tax practitioner.
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It appears from the data that market segmentation is occurring in the operations of tax
practitioners. Taxpayers who prefer tax practitioners who can minimise their tax
actually find the tax agents who are good at finding loopholes. Taxpayers who prefer
tax agents taking low risk and making no fuss find the tax agents who fit that
description. Perhaps what is most interesting from these data is that the distinction
between tax minimisation that entails little risk and tax minimisation that entails high
risk is somewhat blurred in practice. From the factor analysis, the distinction is clear
in theory in the minds of taxpayers when they describe the attributes of their preferred
tax practitioners. However, when they describe services delivered by the tax
practitioners they are currently using, the distinction between the low risk and high
risk approach cannot be sustained.
Summary of findings
The following four questions were examined in this paper: 1) How do taxpayers judge
their own competence and diligence in preparing their income tax returns? 2) Who do
taxpayers rely on when preparing their income tax returns? 3) What are the attributes
that taxpayers are looking for in tax practitioners? and 4) Do taxpayers find the
practitioners who meet their needs? The findings reported in this paper are
summarised below.
1) How do taxpayers judge their competence and diligence in preparing their income
tax returns?
• Overall, taxpayers were comfortable with the self-assessment system, although
they were not complacent about their knowledge.
• The majority of taxpayers reported confidence in the legitimacy of the deductions
they claimed.
• Just over a half of the taxpayers denied that they placed a low priority on tax
matters.
2) Who do taxpayers rely on when preparing their income tax returns?
• In general, taxpayers relied on only one other external source in preparing their
income tax return (69%).
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•  The tax practitioner was the single most important source of external influence on
taxpayers (77%).
• Only a small percentage of taxpayers relied on the Tax Office (6.5%).
3) What are the attributes that taxpayers are looking for in tax practitioners?
• Having a tax agent who was honest and could help taxpayers comply with the law
was the highest priority for taxpayers.
• Taxpayers who were currently using a tax practitioner rated honesty as that
person’s most important identifying feature.
• While honesty may have been the number one issue for taxpayers, cautious
minimisation of tax with conflict avoidance was not far behind.
4) Do taxpayers find the practitioners who meet their needs?
• Taxpayers found tax agents who matched their needs.
• Taxpayers who placed a priority on minimising their tax found practitioners who
could do the job, in addition to offering clever strategies and suggesting
aggressive tax minimisation schemes.
• Taxpayers who wanted to comply with the spirit of the law found tax agents who
they believed to be honest and respectful of their position.
Discussion and implication of findings
The literature has documented the divergent pressures that tax practitioners
experience. Tax authorities look to tax practitioners for support in law enforcement,
taxpayers look to them to minimise the tax they must pay, and professional
associations issue ethical guidelines on best practice to safeguard professional
reputation.
While acknowledging that these pressures exist, less consensus surrounds the effects
these pressures have on the professional integrity of tax practitioners. In part, different
views and findings can be explained by national differences. There is no reason to
assume that the norms associated with taxpaying are identical across countries,
particularly given the fact that tax systems are owned and designed by sovereign
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states with different laws and histories. With these considerations in mind, this study
was designed to have a national focus. The purpose was to map the ways in which a
random sample of taxpayers saw the role of tax practitioners in the tax system in
Australia.
The perspective of taxpayers was considered important for two reasons. First, debate
often focuses on the issue of whether tax practitioners are encouraging taxpayers to
take more risks in the grey areas of tax law, or whether taxpayers are demanding that
tax practitioners broach these new areas to better serve their interests. Undoubtedly,
evidence can be found for influence of both kinds within any tax system. The question
addressed in this paper, however, is whether or not there is a nationwide expectation
that tax practitioners will take more risks, and an expectation that they will do so at
the expense of their professional integrity.
The second reason for focusing on the taxpayers’ perspective arises out of taxpayer
need. If taxpayers are confident in operating within a self-assessment system, their
reliance on tax practitioners should be based more on convenience than necessity. In
this situation, tax practitioners may well feel somewhat vulnerable when confronted
with demanding clients. They may feel that their livelihood depends on having clever
strategies up their sleeve to hold on to their client base. On the other hand, if
taxpayers rely on tax practitioners for guidance in tax matters and look to them to give
them confidence and security, one might argue that tax practitioners have a role to
play in setting standards and defining acceptable risks in the future. Results of this
study show that this is indeed the case.
Being the sole adviser, however, does not guarantee influence. Tax practitioners must
be a credible source of information for taxpayers if they are to offer advice and have it
accepted (Hansen, Crosser & Laufer, 1992). The importance of influence is suggested
in Tan’s (1999) finding that taxpayers valued the relationship they had with their tax
practitioners above all else. The results reported in this paper support the view that
first and foremost, tax practitioners are people who taxpayers can trust to keep them
on the right side of the law. Having an honest tax agent or adviser was the highest
priority for this sample of Australians. Furthermore, those who were currently using a
tax practitioner rated honesty as that person’s most important identifying feature.
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These data suggest that the core important contribution tax practitioners make to
Australian taxpayers as a whole is to give them confidence that their tax matters are
under control and that their taxpaying behaviour is within the bounds of the law.
While low risk without fuss may have been the number one issue for taxpayers,
cautious minimisation of tax with conflict avoidance was not far behind. The findings
in relation to cautious minimisation of tax with conflict avoidance are insightful for a
number of reasons. First, when taxpayers were asked about their preferred attributes
in tax practitioners, the issue of honesty was separate from tax minimisation. In other
words, people could portray their ideal tax practitioner as honest without particular
cleverness in tax minimisation, honest with cleverness, or dishonest with cleverness.
Most importantly, taxpayers overall did not feel any need to trade off honesty for
cleverness.
These data support Klepper, Magin and Zagin’s (1991) claim that tax practitioners are
both enforcers of the tax law (in unambiguous situations) and exploiters of the tax law
(in ambiguous situations). Our cautious minimisers of tax appear to come closest to
this ‘dual role’. The low risk with no fuss approach fits the profile of those who
prioritise the enforcer role over the exploiter role. The creative accountant, aggressive
tax planning approach, on the other hand, prioritises the exploiter role over the
enforcer role.
The second finding of considerable importance is that taxpayers, in their ideal world,
made a distinction between tax minimisation that is unlikely to lead to conflict and tax
minimisation that is more risky and likely to fuel conflict with tax authorities.
Admittedly, an appreciation for a gentle approach was positively correlated with an
appreciation of an aggressive approach. Taxpayers interested in tax minimisation
were open to having a tax practitioner who knew both low and high risk strategies.
Nevertheless, the emergence of two distinct factors representing tax minimisation
with conflict avoidance on the one hand, and tax minimisation with high risk (creative
accounting, aggressive tax planning) on the other, indicates that taxpayers are mindful
of the question, ‘How much risk do they want to engage in?’
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When data relating to the ideal tax practitioner were correlated with descriptions of
the tax practitioners taxpayers were currently using, evidence emerged of taxpayers
finding tax agents who matched their needs. Taxpayers who placed a priority on
minimising their tax found practitioners who could offer clever strategies for how this
could be done and who could suggest aggressive tax minimisation schemes. On the
other hand, taxpayers who liked to ‘do the right thing’ and comply with the spirit of
the law’ found tax practitioners who they believed to be honest and respectful of their
position.
These data are consistent with those reported by Marshall et al. (1998) who conclude
that there is considerable diversity among Australian tax practitioners in the ethical
stances they take. Tax practitioners appear to be successful in marketing their skills in
a way that is suitable to their clients’ needs, or at least taxpayers have ways of finding
the tax practitioners who suit them best. Either way, the income liability of taxpayers
is likely to be determined to a considerable degree by the ‘team play’ between
taxpayers and their tax agents.
During the process of matching taxpayer with tax practitioner, it is of note that
taxpayers who prefer tax minimisation with low risk find themselves with tax
practitioners who are not ostensibly different from those serving taxpayers who are
open to high risk. The data in Table 9 show that tax practitioners serving both groups
include game players who are more likely to propose complicated schemes to avoid
tax. In other words, while taxpayers tend to segregate low risk and high risk
minimisation schemes in their thinking about tax matters, these data suggest that, in
practice, they can find themselves with similar kinds of tax agents, some of whom are
likely to support tax avoidance. This highlights the problems posed by legal
ambiguity about what is acceptable minimisation behaviour and what is not.
Taxpayers appear to rely on their tax agents to make these judgements, and tax agents
are more adventurous in their assessment of what ‘has a realistic possibility of being
sustained administratively or judicially’ than others (Hansen, Crosser & Laufer, 1992:
76).
It is in this domain at the fringe of tax legitimacy that taxpayers and tax practitioners
are probably at greatest risk of pushing each other towards illegality. The answer to
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these problems may lie in legal reforms that impose overarching principles to
safeguard against use of loopholes (for example, see RMC case, cited in McBarnet &
Whelan, 1999: 105–107). But increasing risks of detection of illegality cannot resolve
the tensions that undoubtedly characterise a proportion of taxpayer–practitioner
relationships where tax minimisation is a priority concern. Without a clear
understanding of what it means to be a low risk minimiser or a high risk minimiser,
tax agents and taxpayers who want to play this game may be misreading each others’
messages much of the time and failing to deliver on the expectations of the other. On
balance, this appears to represent a small group of Australian taxpayer–practitioner
relationships. It is a group, however, that is likely to destabilise the nature of the
professional relationship between tax practitioners and their clients.
Overall, these findings fit comfortably with those of Marshall et al. (1998) who have
shown that while tax practitioners see scope for abuse of the system, they do not feel
pressured to take part themselves and they are well in control of their professional
relationships with clients. Marshall et al. (1998) paint a picture of professionals who
are aware of competing pressures but who are able to manage them. Having to work
at finding this kind of professional integrity is a challenge that faces many other
professions (for example, lawyers and medical practitioners). There is little doubt that
competing pressures from different interest groups not only burden individuals, but
also undermine compliance systems. Yet we know from other regulatory contexts that
one of the best strategies for restoring compliance in a system is to give professionals
the support they need to find a way to balance the competing pressures that threaten
compliance (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1993).
This paper suggests that Australian tax practitioners are ideally placed to develop
ways in which they can establish their own sense of professional integrity that eases
the tensions with their various stakeholders. For the Australian population as a whole,
the tensions are not as great as one might expect. Marshall et al. (1998) have
demonstrated that most tax practitioners can manage the tensions that exist. Bedding
down the best practice of such practitioners will hopefully help all stakeholders
converge on strategies that will contain, if not correct, the legal and professional
abuses that are pocketed within the community.
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Appendix I: Social-demographic indicators and their descriptive statistics
(minimum n = 1867)
Indicators Descriptive Statistic
Personal income/year in thousands Mean = 27.83
Standard deviation = 27.31
Age Mean = 48.39
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